Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they exist, but this property does not hold in the more general case of weak tournaments. In this paper we analyze the relationship between the usual choice functions and the set of maximal elements in weak tournaments. We introduce choice functions selecting maximal elements, whenever they exist. Moreover, we compare these choice functions with those that already exist in the literature.
Introduction
In the literature on preferences, there are a great number of papers devoted to the analysis of the existence of maximal elements, as they are considered "the best ones". In order to ensure the existence of maximal elements in all feasible subsets of X, the acyclicity of the binary relation P is a necessary condition; but there are many contexts in which requiring acyclicity of the binary relation a priori is too rigid a restriction. This is the case of realistic social decision mechanisms as, for instance, majority voting in which cycles may appear. Moreover, requiring acyclicity, together with some other axioms, in social decision functions gives rise to impossibility results. As pointed out by Schwartz (1986) , "... the impossibility theorems show acyclicity to be unreasonable as a general assumption about collective preference -although not necessarily unreasonable when restricted to special situations. It seems unreasonable as a general assumption about individual preferences as well".
This fact has inspired many papers on the problem of choosing the best elements when binary relations are not necessarily acyclic, as in the case of tournaments (asymmetric and complete binary relations), or weak tournaments where the binary relation is merely complete (this generalization of the notion of tournaments is interesting because it allows indifferences or ties). In these contexts, because of the non-existence, in general, of maximal elements, it is not quite clear what the definition of "the best elements" is, and several solution concepts (choice functions), from both the positive and the axiomatic points of view, have been introduced.
In the case of tournaments, the relation between the selected elements for any well-defined choice function and the maximal elements is always clear: the existence of maximal elements cannot be ensured, but if there is a maximal element, it will be the one that beats all other alternatives (Condorcet winner ) and the choice function selects precisely such an element.
In tournaments, therefore, the choice set and the set of maximals (if it is nonempty) coincide.
In the case of weak tournaments, however, the relationship between maximal elements and choice functions is not so clear and, as we will show, the choice functions defined in the literature for this case do not always coincide with the set of maximal elements: some of them select a larger set (with regard to the inclusion relation), while others may select elements of which none of them is in fact maximal.
We are interested in defining a choice function, in the framework of weak tournaments, such that it chooses maximal elements, whenever they exist,
and then generalizes what happens in the case of tournaments.
Weak Tournaments and Maximal Elements
Let us consider the following definitions and notation.
A tournament T = (X, U) consists of a non-empty finite set of alternatives X and a binary relation U defined on X which is complete [∀x, y ∈ X, x = y ⇒ xUy or yUx] and asymmetric [xUy ⇒ not(yUx)]. A weak tournament W = (X, R) is a generalization of the previous concept which only requires strong completeness of the binary relation R [∀x, y ∈ X, ⇒ xRy or yRx].
We denote the family of tournaments by T , while W represents the family of weak tournaments.
A choice function F is a map that assigns a non-empty choice set (the selected alternatives) in X, to each tournament or weak tournament. Given two choice functions F, G, F = G, it is said that F is contained in G (or that F is more discriminating than G), denoted as F ⊂ G, if for all weak tournaments W = (X, R),
Given a weak tournament W = (X, R), for each subset A of X, the maximal set is denoted by M(A, R) = {x ∈ A | xRy, ∀ y ∈ A, y = x}. Under the standard interpretation, M(A, R) can be interpreted as the best elements in A, for the binary relation R. 
The transitive closure of the relation P on X is defined analogously: xP ∞ y if and only if there are x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ∈ X such that x = x 1 P x 2 P ... P x n = y. Note that, in general, P ∞ does not coincide with the asymmetric part of R ∞ .
Given a weak tournament W = (X, R) and A ⊆ X, W | A denotes the weak tournament (A, R | A ) where R | A is the restriction of R on the subset A. We now use the following function g W :
X × X → {−1, 0, 1} to completely represent a weak tournament W = (X, R) :
or, in a matrix form, if X = {x 1 , ..., x r }, 
Choice functions for weak tournaments
The choice functions defined for tournaments satisfy the following property (Condorcet choice functions):
F (T ) = {x} whenever xUy, ∀y ∈ X, x = y 6 or, in other words, F (T ) = M(X, U) whenever the maximal set is non-empty.
As we have already mentioned, this is not the case for choice functions defined for weak tournaments. In order to show this, we analyze Condorcet choice functions that have been generalized to the context of weak tournaments:
The top cycle, denoted as T C, is the first reference for a solution to a tournament T = (X, U ) ∈ T , and it is defined by the elements x ∈ X such that xU ∞ y for all y ∈ X, y = x. Its extension for weak tournaments T C(W ), known as the GOCHA set (Schwartz, 1972) , is defined as the maximal elements in X of the transitive closure R ∞ .
The uncovered set (Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1980 ) of a tournament 
The minimal covering is a covering set B such that no proper subset of B is a covering set. Dutta (1988) proves that for any tournament T, such a subset always exists and is unique. These two choice functions have been extended for weak tournaments (Peris and Subiza, 1999) in such a way that they satisfy the same axioms as in tournaments.
Another important solution concept for tournaments that has been generalized to weak tournaments is the Bipartisan set For weak tournaments the set-comparisons are the same (see Peris and Subiza, 1999; Dutta and Laslier, 1999),
When applied to tournaments, all the above-mentioned solutions are
Condorcet choice functions, so that if there is a maximal element, all solutions agree in their choice of the Condorcet winner. Let us show that this is not necessarily true when it is applied to weak tournaments.
Example 1 Let W = (X, R) the weak tournament where X = {a, b, c}
, 0)) is an equilibrium of the zero-sum game defined by this weak tournament.
In the following proposition we prove that the maximal elements, when they exist, are included in the essential set, and therefore, in the minimal covering, the uncovered set and the top cycle.
Proposition 1 Given a weak tournament
Proof. Consider the zero-sum game defined by the payoff function g W associated to the weak tournament W = (X, R). Then if x ∈ M(X, R),
is a saddle-point and x ∈ ES(W ). Moreover, Example 1 shows that this inclusion may be proper. 
Generalized Condorcet condition
To expect acyclicity of the binary relation (that is, to insist on the existence of maximal elements in every subset of the feasible set) is not reasonable when considered as a global assumption. Nevertheless, it is possible that maximal elements exist in some subsets (for instance, in subsets with just two elements). Whenever maximal elements exist, a desirable property of a choice function is that it selects these maximal elements exclusively. Let us call the choice functions that satisfy this property general Condorcet choice functions:
Definition 1 A choice function F defined in the family of weak tournaments is said to be a g-Condorcet choice function if for each weak tournament It is easy to prove that P is an asymmetric and transitive binary relation, so that M(X, R) is a non-empty set (see Peris and Subiza, 1994) . We know that, given a preference relation R, maximal elements exist if and only if the quotient relation has maximal classes with cardinality 1. Therefore, if
we wish to define a choice function that satisfies the g-Condorcet condition, we must consider only the classes with cardinality 1, whenever they exist.
This fact induces us to select the maximal classes with the lowest possible cardinalities: we denote the classes in M(X, R) with minimal cardinality by
where #(·) denotes the cardinality of a finite set.
Definition 2
The Rational Top Cycle choice function assigns, to each weak tournament W = (X, R), the set
cl(x).
In the following theorem, we prove that the Rational Top Cycle is a gCondorcet choice function that generalizes the top cycle to the case of weak tournaments.
Theorem 1
a) The Rational Top Cycle is a g-Condorcet choice function. c) The inclusion is obvious from the fact that the top cycle may be written as:
and Example 1 shows that T C * (W ) may be strictly included in T C(W ),
Definition 3
The Rational Essential choice function assigns, to each weak tournament W = (X, R), the set
Theorem 2 a) The Rational Essential is a g-Condorcet choice function. b) For all tournament T = (X, U), ES * (T ) = ES(T ).
c) ES * ⊂ ES.
Proof.
a) Analogous to part a) in the previous Theorem.
b) If T = (X, U) ∈ T , there is just one maximal class on M(X, R) which is precisely the Top Cycle of this tournament, T C(T ). Therefore,
be the payoff function associated to the weak-tournament (W | cl(x) ).
Then, x ∈ supp(p * ), where (p * , p * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game with payoff function g W cl(x) . Let us consider the following strategy of the game defined by g W , the payoff function associated to the weak-tournament W ,
Let us see that (p , p ) is a Nash equilibrium of the game g W . To do so, it is sufficient (see, for instance, Owen, 1982) to prove that
p (y), and that
Condition (1) is fulfilled, since supp(p ) = supp(p * ). In order to verify (2), let us suppose first that z / ∈ supp(p ), and z ∈ cl(x). Then,
In this case, therefore, condition (2) 
Just as we did with the Rational Essential choice function, we can also define the Rational Uncovered Set, or the Rational Minimal Covering as extensions of the corresponding choice functions on T that satisfy the gCondorcet property by setting:
We have focused our attention on the Essential set, since it is more discriminating than the other choice functions.
An Undominated Selection
Apart from introducing the Essential Set (in the more general framework As we have proven in Theorem 2, the Rational Essential set is included in the Essential set, but as we will see in Example 2, it may still contain weak dominated alternatives. In this section, we define a selection of the Rational Essential set satisfying monotonicity, which no longer contains dominated alternatives. First of all, definitions of weak dominance and monotonicity are introduced, and then it is proven that a g-Condorcet choice function is not, in general, compatible with the elimination of weakly dominated alternatives.
Definition 4 Given a weak tournament W = (X, R), it is said that alternative y is weakly dominated by alternative x in such a weak tournament if for all z ∈ X, g W (x, z) ≥ g W (y, z), with at least one strict inequality. The undominated set is defined as those alternatives in X which are not weakly dominated by any other alternative, UD(W ) = {x ∈ X | no element in X weakly dominates x}.
Definition 5 A choice function F defined in the family of weak tournaments satisfies Undominance if for all weak tournaments W = (X, R), F (W ) ⊆
UD(W ).
Undominance is a desirable property, but it is, in general, incompatible with the g-Condorcet property, since maximal elements may be weakly dominated. The following example shows this fact.
Example 2 Let W = (X, R) be the weak tournament in which X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and x 1 P x 2 , x 1 Ix 3 , x 2 Ix 3 . Then, any choice function which contains M(X, R) = {x 1 , x 3 } does not satisfy Undominance, since x 1 weakly dominates x 3 .
If we apply Undominance several times,
we are eliminating, in a sequential way, alternatives that are weakly dominated in successive subsets of undominated elements of X. This sequence converges to a set UD ∞ (W ) that represents the elements that "survive" sequential elimination (Dutta and Laslier, 1999) . Another desirable property of choice functions is that of Monotonicity, which can be stated in the following way:
Definition 6 A choice function F defined in the family of weak tournaments satisfies Monotonicity if for all weak tournaments W = (X, R), W = (X, R ) such that: W = W except for some pair of elements (x, y) such that
Dutta and Laslier (1999) provide an example showing that the choice function defined by
does not satisfy Monotonicity. We will use the same example to show the impossibility of finding a choice function that satisfies Monotonicity and sequential elimination of weakly dominated alternatives: 
If we consider a non-empty valued choice function S satisfying sequential Undominance, then:
which is incompatible with Monotonicity.
We now introduce a selection of the Rational Essential choice function by choosing, from the elements in ES * (W ), those that are not weakly dominated.
Definition 7
To each weak tournament W = (X, R), the UndominatedEssential choice function assigns the set
c) The UES choice function satisfies Monotonicity.
d) The UES choice function satisfies Undominance.
Proof.
a) The fact that UES ⊂ ES * follows directly from the definition.
Therefore, we must only prove the non-emptiness of this choice function.
(1) Suppose that there is a maximal element; then it can only be dominated by another maximal element, so there is a maximal element which is not dominated and the choice function is non-empty, since it coincides with the maximal elements which are undominated.
(2) Suppose now that there are no maximal elements (in this case, the classes in M(X, R) will contain, at least, 3 elements). First note that an element in a maximal class can only be dominated by another element in that class. If, in the contrary, cl(x) is a maximal class such that there is y / ∈ cl(x) weak-dominating x, we know that xP z for some z ∈ cl(x) and then domination implies yP z, that is, cl(y)Pcl(x), contradicting that cl(x) is a maximal class.
We know that the Essential set, applied to the maximal classes of minimal cardinality, contains undominated elements in this class (see Dutta and Laslier, 1999) , and then undominated in the whole set of alternatives.
b) Obvious from the definition of UES and from the fact that ES * is a g-Condorcet choice function.
c) Let W = (X, R), W = (X, R ) be two weak tournaments such that W = W except for some pair of elements (x, y) such that g W (x, y) > g W (x, y);
and suppose x ∈ UES(W ). Then, cl(x; W ) ∈ mcM(W ). We have the following possibilities:
(1) y / ∈ cl(x; W ):
then cl(x; W ) = cl(x; W ), and x ∈ ES * (W ). Moreover, it is obvious that if x ∈ UD(W ), then x ∈ UD(W ), so x ∈ UES(W ).
(2) y ∈ cl(x; W ): then, as W = W except for x and y, the other classes remain unchanged, and for the class cl(x, W ) we have two possibilities:
cl(x; W ) = cl(x, W ) or cl(x, W ) ⊂ cl(x, W ).
(2a) cl(x; W ) = cl(x; W ):
The same argument as in case (1) is an equilibrium in the game with payoff matrix G 11 , which implies x ∈ ES(W | cl(x;W ) ). Therefore, x ∈ UES(W ).
d) Follows directly from definition.
